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AIR AMBULANCES AND STATE CONTRACT CLAIMS:
THE OPENING TO AVOID ADA PREEMPTION
JOHN DAVID JANICEK*
I. THE INDIVIDUAL DILEMMA
LIFE FLIGHTS BY AIR AMBULANCES produce positive med-ical outcomes for hundreds of thousands of injured and sick
people every year.1 Though they provide a net positive to soci-
ety, patients transported in these air ambulances often find
themselves with an enormous issue other than their health—
crippling debt.2 In Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., two classes of
plaintiffs brought action in federal court making a series of
claims to avoid having to pay the remaining balance of their air
ambulance bills.3 Although the Tenth Circuit ultimately dis-
missed the complaints after finding the claims were preempted
by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), the court opened the
door for a future plaintiff with the proper facts and pleadings to
finally crack through the preemption stronghold of the ADA.4
This has the potential to upend the legal status quo that cur-
rently favors air ambulance companies. If the relevant parties
become frustrated with cases having widely different outcomes
as a result of seemingly minor differences between cases, they
could effectuate change to a more equitable system.
Air ambulances serve two primary roles in medical transporta-
tion. They can travel quickly through the air, unencumbered by
issues like traffic or natural obstructions, and they have the nec-
essary medical equipment on board, so they are frequently
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.A., Texas A&M
University, 2018.
1 See generally Akkie N. Ringburg et al., Lives Saved by Helicopter Emergency Medical
Services: An Overview of Literature, 28 AIR MED. J. 298 (2009).
2 See Rachel Bluth, Why Air Ambulance Bills Are Still Sky-High, NPR (June 14,
2019), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/06/14/732174170/
why-air-ambulance-bills-are-still-sky-high [https://perma.cc/UV2T-6WEQ].
3 Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir. 2019).
4 See id. at 1063–66.
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called to the scene of traumatic injuries when a patient needs to
be taken to a trauma center as quickly as possible.5 Additionally,
for those same reasons, they are also often used to transport pa-
tients between medical facilities when proper.6 These services
may be provided by a helicopter or airplane.7 Their services are
of great benefit to patient health, but the activity is expensive to
operate for companies.8 As a result, it is well established that air
ambulance companies charge “exorbitant” rates for their ser-
vices.9 Fees are often as high as $40,000,10 and they are up 300%
since 2006 in some areas.11 To compound the problem, insur-
ance companies usually cover only a fraction of the bill, leaving
the patients to pay tens of thousands of dollars on average.12
Many of these patients are either severely injured, dying, or
dead, and their families cannot afford to pay bills of this size in
addition to all the other bills the infirmity will have created.
In Scarlett, the defendants were two companies that provide
air ambulance services, Air Methods Corporation and Rocky
Mountain Holdings, LLC.13 The plaintiffs were two separate
classes of individuals (some representing their minor children)
who were provided air ambulance services by one of the two de-
fendants.14 The court referred to the members of the first class
as the “Scarlett Plaintiffs,” who had an average initial bill of
$47,000, of which their insurance on average covered $12,000.15
The court called the other class members the “Cowen Plaintiffs”;
similarly, they had an average bill of $48,500, and their insur-
5 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., An Arm and a Leg: Paying for Helicopter Air Ambulances,
2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 317, 326–29 (2016).
6 See id. at 330–31.
7 See Karen Beasley Grabenstein, Air-Medical Services: Then and Now, EMS
WORLD (Aug. 2019), https://www.emsworld.com/article/1223054/air-medical-
services-then-and-now [https://perma.cc/DTR2-VBAC].
8 Though this operation is expensive, it could be operated at a lower cost. The
huge spike in cost has been attributed to “[a] 434% increase in Medicare reim-
bursement rates in 2002 [that] caused new providers to enter the market.” Per-
ritt, An Arm and a Leg, supra note 5, at 324; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., No Way to
Run an “Airline”: Surviving an Air Ambulance Ride, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 83, 98
(2017).
9 See, e.g., Tanner Holton, Note, Air Ambulance Service Providers: A Lifesaving In-
dustry and a Financial Catastrophe, 92 N.D. L. REV. 473, 477 (2017).
10 Perritt, An Arm and a Leg, supra note 5, at 324.
11 See Bluth, supra note 2.
12 See Holton, supra note 9, at 474–75.
13 Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053, 1057 (10th Cir. 2019).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1057–58.
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ance companies on average only paid $7,400 of that total.16 Both
classes disputed their obligations to pay the defendants the en-
tire amount of the bill they incurred.17
Although the groups of plaintiffs presented numerous
claims,18 this Casenote focuses on the two that have the greatest
potential legal implications. First, the plaintiffs argued they had
implied contracts with the defendants, which the defendants
breached by charging prices in excess of fair market value for
their services.19 The Scarlett Plaintiffs made their contract claim
based on state law,20 while the Cowen Plaintiffs based theirs in
federal common law.21 Both groups of plaintiffs asserted that
their claims were not preempted by the ADA.22 Alternatively, it
was argued that, if the plaintiffs could not bring an implied-in-
law contract claim in state court to resolve this dispute because
of ADA preemption, under the precedent of Dan’s City,23 the
defendants should not be able to bring debt collection actions
in state courts based on equitable principles.24 Both cases were
dismissed by district courts through defendants’ 12(b)(6) mo-
tion to dismiss.25 The lower court ruled that the Scarlett Plain-
tiffs’ contract claim was preempted by the ADA,26 and the
Cowen Plaintiffs’ contract claim was invalid because there is no
federal common law in this area.27 The argument under Dan’s
City was not before the district courts—it was raised by the U.S.
government on appeal.28
II. THE LEGAL DILEMMA
Although the regulation of the service rate for air ambulance
companies seems like an issue that would be relatively easy for
state legislatures to create a palatable solution, they are pre-
vented from doing so. The ADA was enacted to “encourage, de-
velop, and attain an air transportation system that relied on
16 Id. at 1059.
17 Id. at 1057.
18 See id. at 1058–59.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1058.
21 Id. at 1059.
22 Id. at 1058, 1067.
23 See generally Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013).
24 Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1062–63.
25 Id. at 1058–59.
26 Id. at 1058.
27 Id. at 1059.
28 Id. at 1063–64.
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competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety, and
price of air services.”29 To accomplish this end, Congress in-
cluded an explicit preemption clause that says, “[s]tates may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an
air carrier that may provide air transportation.”30 This language
has been applied to a wide reaching amount of activity.31
By the ADA’s text alone, it was not clear if air ambulance ser-
vice fell within its reach. The ADA applies to “air carriers,” but it
does not define them. Elsewhere in the transportation title of
the U.S. Code (Title 49), an air carrier is defined as “a citizen of
the United States undertaking by any means, directly or indi-
rectly, to provide air transportation.”32 This has been consist-
ently held to apply to air ambulances.33
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has clarified the wide
reach of the ADA, curbing existing and possible state legislation
on the subject.34 The first time the Court considered the ADA’s
reach was Morales, in which the Court held the plain meaning of
the ADA’s words meant there was much more that was pre-
empted than just state laws that directly regulate price, route, or
service.35 Specifically, the Court said anything “relating to” an
airline rate is preempted,36 which is a vast amount of activity.
Next, in Wolens, the Court identified an exception to ADA pre-
emption.37 The Court said the ADA would not shield airlines
from breach-of-contract claims because they are “privately or-
29 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction and Application of § 105 Airline Der-
egulation Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 41713), Pertaining to Preemption of Authority over Prices,
Routes, and Services, 149 A.L.R. FED. 299 (1998).
30 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2018).
31 See, e.g., Bower v. EgyptAir Airlines Co., 731 F.3d 85, 97–98 (1st Cir. 2013)
(holding that the ADA preempts claims for tortious interference with custodial
relations based on ticketing procedure); Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Cuomo, 520
F.3d 218, 220–23 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that the ADA preempts
state laws requiring airlines provide passengers with food and water during
lengthy delays); N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. FedEx Corp., 892 F. Supp.
2d 861, 863, 867–69 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that the ADA preempts claim for
negligence loss of medical documents by an air carrier).
32 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2018).
33 See, e.g., Valley Med Flight, Inc. v. Dwelle, 171 F. Supp. 3d 930, 934, 938–40
(D.N.D. 2016).
34 See Andrew J. Upton, Comment, Air Ambulance Reform – Why Congress Should
Exempt Air Ambulances From “Carrier” Classification and Preemption Under the Airline
Deregulation Act, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 431, 440–42 (2017).
35 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385–88, 385 n.2 (1992).
36 Id. at 383–86.
37 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228–29 (1995).
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dered obligations” and thus do not enforce a state regulation.38
In the last relevant case on ADA preemption, the Court revisited
this contract exception in Ginsberg.39 There, the plaintiff filed a
claim against an airline for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing after the company removed his frequent flyers
status.40 Narrowing the Wolens decision, the Court held that
common law claims could still be preempted if they had the
“force and effect of [state] law.”41 So if the action tries to en-
force a state-imposed obligation, it is preempted. On the other
hand, if the parties voluntarily undertook the relevant aspect of
the contract (e.g., price), it would be a private obligation free
from preemption.42
In Scarlett, the court gave little consideration to the multiple
claims argued by the plaintiffs because they had no potential
given the existing precedent. Instead, the court gave attention
to an issue of first impression for the Tenth Circuit. Both classes
of plaintiffs made breach-of-implied-contract claims, stating that
the defendants charged them more than the reasonable value of
the service provided.43 The court held that the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment for an implied-in-law contract was factually insufficient
based on their own pleadings and claims, thus the claims were
preempted by the ADA.44 The more important aspect of the
holding for future cases was the court’s acknowledgment that an
implied-in-fact contract would survive ADA preemption.45 Addi-
tionally, based on Dan’s City and Ginsberg, the court accepted
that the defendants may not attempt to use equitable principles
in their recovery efforts against plaintiffs at state court.46 This
was not dispositive of any issue in the case because the defend-
ants’ state court claims were not before the court at that time.47
The two classes of plaintiffs alleged breach-of-contract claims
under different sources of law. The Cowen Plaintiffs based their
breach claim on federal common law, but because Wolens al-
ready made clear that such a claim does not exist under federal
law, the rest of the court’s analysis concentrated on the Scarlett
38 Id.
39 Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 276 (2014).
40 Id. at 278–79.
41 Id. at 281–82.
42 Id. at 276, 281.
43 Scarlett v. Air Methods Corp., 922 F.3d 1053, 1064 (10th Cir. 2019).
44 Id. at 1065–67.
45 Id. at 1065–66.
46 See id. at 1063.
47 Id.
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Plaintiffs’ state contract law claims.48 Neither party disputed that
the claims asserted related to the price of the defendants’ air
ambulance service.49 In order to get past the ADA’s preemption
clause, the Scarlett Plaintiffs’ claims had to “satisfy” the excep-
tion from Wolens and Ginsberg.50 The court described the Gins-
berg–Wolens test as such:
First, ‘[w]hen the law of a State does not authorize parties to free
themselves from [a] covenant, a breach of covenant claim is pre-
empted under the reasoning of Wolens.’ Second, ‘[w]hen the ap-
plication of [an] implied covenant depends on state policy, a
breach of implied covenant claim cannot be viewed as simply an
attempt to vindicate the parties’ implicit understanding of the
contract.’51
Thus, determining the nature of the contract would be disposi-
tive for preemption issues because, if it was a contract that en-
forced a private agreement and not state policy, the test would
be satisfied.
The court began with a rudimentary contract law analysis, dif-
ferentiating the three types of contracts: express, implied-in-fact,
and implied-in-law (quasi-contract).52 The plaintiffs did not con-
tend that the parties had an express contract, so the court did
not elaborate on it.53 Instead, the court contrasted the two re-
maining types of contracts. It said an implied-in-fact agreement
is one “inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing,
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit under-
standing.”54 On the other hand, “an agreement implied in law is
a ‘fiction of law’ where ‘a promise is imputed to perform a legal
duty . . . .’”55
The plaintiffs failed to distinguish which of these implied con-
tracts they claimed to have formed, which is crucial for deter-
mining preemption.56 An implied-in-law contract is unavoidably
an application of state law because it is a legal fiction created by
48 Id. at 1064.
49 Id. at 1062.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1061–62 (citations omitted) (quoting Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572
U.S. 273, 287–88 (2014)).
52 Id. at 1064.
53 See id.
54 Id. (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 424 (1996)). But
the defendants did claim an express contract existed, and as will be discussed
infra, this was the reason the Dan’s City argument failed. See id. at 1063–64.
55 Id. at 1064 (quoting Hercules, 516 U.S. at 424).
56 Id. at 1065.
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the state, and the claim is thus preempted by the ADA.57 Unfor-
tunately, the Scarlett Plaintiffs had almost entirely argued, to the
district court and on appeal, facts that directly contradicted the
requirements for an implied-in-fact contract.58 Specifically, they
had claimed there was no meeting of the minds or agreement to
any terms, both requirements for implied-in-fact contracts.59 So,
the court found that the plaintiffs made out a breach claim for
an implied-in-law contract, which cannot be an attempt to vindi-
cate the understanding of the parties under the contract be-
cause, without mutual assent, there was no initial understanding
of the terms.60 Still, the court laid out a potential argument for
an implied-in-fact contract breach claim to survive preemption
based on the two-part test.61 It said a breach of implied-in-fact
contract claim could succeed “[i]f the parties can contract
around the implied price term and the implied price term ‘ef-
fectuate[s] the intentions of [the] parties . . . .’”62
A second point of contention merits attention. The United
States government injected a Dan’s City argument into the dis-
pute.63 The rule established in Dan’s City is that a party may not
rely on federal preemption to block state law claims by a plain-
tiff and then take advantage of state law against the same plain-
tiff in a separate action on the same facts.64 Applied here, the
government argued that the defendants could not claim the
plaintiffs’ implied contract claims were preempted by the ADA
and then use those same equitable contract principles in state
court to recover money from the plaintiff.65 The court did not
reject the logic of this argument, but nonetheless, it did not find
in favor of the plaintiffs. The court stated that, throughout the
present lawsuit, the defendants maintained that they had ex-
press contracts with the plaintiffs (save for briefly at oral argu-
ment), so the court would rely on their representations and not
assume the defendants were trying to have it both ways.66 Signifi-
cantly, the court said that if, in fact, the defendants did claim in
57 Id. at 1065–66.
58 Id. at 1066–67.
59 Id. at 1065–66.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1065.
62 Id. (quoting Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286–88 (2014)). This
is a succinct restatement of the Ginsberg–Wolens test. See Ginsberg, 572 U.S. at 286.
63 Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1062.
64 Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 265 (2013).
65 See Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1063.
66 Id. at 1063–64.
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their state court breach actions that they formed implied con-
tracts with the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs would be free to raise a
Dan’s City argument at that time.67
III. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATION
The court’s ruling is in line with Supreme Court precedent
and tenets of contract law. The result is the same air-ambulance-
company-friendly ruling as all the cases that have come before.
The real value of this precedent is the different avenues the
court explicitly created for future plaintiffs to avoid preemption
(or otherwise enforce preemption equally on the air ambulance
companies) under the correct, narrow set of facts.
The first path is to argue around preemption, through the
Ginsberg–Wolens exception to the ADA. To do this, future plain-
tiffs must have a fact pattern that makes an argument for the
formation of an implied-in-fact contract. Offer, acceptance, mu-
tual assent, and consideration are still required elements for im-
plied-in-fact contracts,68 but they can be established through
conduct instead of in writing.69 Plaintiffs must argue that their
conduct, in effect, shows acceptance of an offer to be trans-
ported in an air ambulance and pay for the service later. The
conduct must also show mutual assent, as this is an essential dis-
tinction from a quasi-contract.70 But plaintiffs cannot in any
way—in writing, orally, or by conduct—have accepted a specific
fee rate; otherwise, they likely formed an express contract.71
These requirements are possible for some plaintiffs to meet and
impossible for others. Many patients are incapacitated at the
time of injury without a legal guardian there to bind them and
thus will have a hard time showing mutual assent. If these re-
quirements are met, then the plaintiff has met the threshold
(but most challenging) aspect of the exception for implied-in-
fact contracts. This leaves at issue the implied term of price.72
To pass the Ginsberg–Wolens test, the plaintiff must show that
67 Id. at 1063 & n.3.
68 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 (4th ed. 2003 & Supp.
July 2019).
69 1–2 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 38 (5th ed. 2011).
70 See Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1064 n.5.
71 LORD, supra note 68, § 1:5.
72 Lack of an agreement to a price term does not mean that the parties did not
form an implied-in-fact contract. See 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR,
JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2:10 n.3 (2002 & Supp. Jan.
2020) (citing Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., Inc., 52 P.3d 848 (Idaho 2002)).
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state law allows for parties to contract around the implied
term.73 This is simple when price is the implied term, since the
price of air ambulance service is never a “state-imposed obliga-
tion,” and as a result, it would not be preempted.74
The second requirement in this scenario presents a slightly
larger challenge. The plaintiff must prove that the implied price
term will be used “to effectuate the intentions of parties or to
protect their reasonable expectations.”75 One would believe air
ambulance patients would have better luck with the second
clause, as they probably do not intend a specific price in con-
tracting for life flights. On the other hand, they very well may
have reasonable expectations of the cost and could make such
an argument easily.76 Although not all air ambulance patients
will have the necessary facts, if patients can convince a court that
they formed implied-in-fact contracts, they will have a relatively
simple time avoiding preemption. Though this Casenote is fo-
cused on paths to avoid preemption, this does not mean the
patients have then dodged their responsibility to pay their bills
altogether. Rather, it means the patients get their day in state
court and can rely on other state law- and common law-based
equitable principles like declaratory judgments or unjust
enrichment.77
The second avenue discussed is based on the precedent of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dan’s City.78 This is a strategy that
would commonly benefit those air ambulance patients that do
not have facts that support an implied-in-fact contract, specifi-
cally those incapacitated at the time of the life flight. Patients
that are fully incapacitated have no ability to form an express
contract because they could not have mutually assented.79 But
the equitable principle of unjust enrichment provides a remedy
73 Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1065 & n.7.
74 See Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 286 (2014).
75 See id.
76 While the Tenth Circuit has already shown hostility to this idea, none is
present in the Scarlett decision. See Schneberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 749 F.
App’x 670, 678–80, 678 n.9 (10th Cir. 2018).
77 See Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1069. But see Stout v. Med-Trans Corp., 313 F. Supp.
3d 1289, 1296–97 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (holding that the ADA preempts unjust en-
richment claims based on allegations that the air ambulance company’s cost of
service was in excess of the reasonable and customary rate).
78 In Schneberger, the plaintiffs made a similar claim for judicial estoppel, but
the court rejected it for the same reasons set forth by the Scarlett court—lack of
proof that the companies were making contradictory claims in state court.
Schneberger, 749 F. App’x at 680–81.
79 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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for a party that confers a benefit on another by creating the le-
gal fiction of a quasi-contract (an implied-in-law contract).80
When a patient refuses payment to the air ambulance company
for the bill, the company usually brings a state claim for recovery
under a breach of implied-in-law contract or some other similar
equitable theory of unjust enrichment.81 This is because, as just
stated, the company will not be able to prove that an incapaci-
tated patient formed an express contract with it, leaving only
implied contracts (and other equitable theories). The result of
arguing for an implied-in-fact contract has been outlined.82 So,
this leaves only the implied-in-law contract on which to base the
company’s recovery claim. Notwithstanding the fact that the
claim should be preempted under the Ginsberg–Wolens test, the
air ambulance company would be protecting itself from the pa-
tient’s equitable claims through ADA preemption, while making
similar claims in state court based on the law it argued is pre-
empted.83 Under Dan’s City, the air ambulance company should
not be permitted to have it both ways. If patients were to bring
this argument to the state court’s attention, they could have the
claim preempted or at least be allowed to counter with their
own state claims. Again, this is all under the presumption that
the patients did not form express contracts, as those claims are
not preempted by the ADA.84
This author does not contend that the preemption clause
should not apply to air ambulances as argued in other scholar-
ship.85 There are all kinds of nightmare scenarios resulting from
varying state laws that could prevent air ambulances from pro-
viding service across states at times when it is the most essen-
tial—something nobody wants.
This was a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit.86
There is no doubt that the court opened the door for future
80 See Juli Loden, Comment, The Earth Is Not Flat, and “A Quasi Contract Is Not a
Contract, at All”—Tennessee Restitution and Unjust Enrichment at Law, 11 TRANSAC-
TIONS 167, 169–72 (2010).
81 Cf. Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1063–64.
82 See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text for discussion of implied-in-
fact contracts.
83 See Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1062–63.
84 See id. at 1064.
85 See Upton, supra note 34, at 434; cf. Perritt, An Arm and a Leg, supra note 5, at
397–401 (arguing that the fees can be brought down by natural market forces if
the ADA is not applied to air ambulances).
86 Scarlett, 922 F.3d at 1060. The court made the assertion it has never directly
settled the question of whether the ADA applies to air ambulances after citing
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plaintiffs to avoid preemption under these paths, but they would
not be the first to try these arguments. Plaintiffs in other courts
have made these exact arguments and failed, like the plaintiffs
in Stout.87 There, the court decided that “forcing [the company]
to accept a lower rate results in the imposition of a state policy-
based standard,”88 and thus implied-in-fact contracts fail the
Ginsberg–Wolens test to avoid preemption.89 It is possible that
upon actually being faced with an implied-in-fact contract, the
court may see the case in a different light, as it did in the
Schneberger case. There, only a year before, the Tenth Circuit
showed hostility to the ideas it seemed to embrace in Scarlett.90
On the other hand, plaintiffs have had success in other courts
making these same arguments.91 The point being, this is not a
novel idea or guaranteed path to success, but given how strongly
the court suggested that an implied-in-fact contract claim could
be viable in the future, it is fair to say that it may be receptive to
the idea. Additionally, there is no telling how a state court may
rule on the plaintiffs’ equitable claims if faced with them. The
avoidance of preemption may not result in the desired outcome,
but a chance for plaintiffs to make their arguments in court
would be a positive step in this field. Further, the frustration
with air ambulance cases being treated differently may force
reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
Air ambulance fees are a pressing issue for states in the Tenth
Circuit because the region is mountainous and rural, making
the service very important. As Scarlett was the first time the court
had considered ADA preemption as it applies to these services,
the case had potential for significant implications. It delivered
on this potential by showing future plaintiffs the path—and the
court’s willingness—to avoid preemption of state contract
claims. It did so by appropriately reading the Ginsberg–Wolens
cases that seem to do just that. See, e.g., Schneberger v. Air Evac EMS, Inc., 749 F.
App’x 670, 673 n.4 (10th Cir. 2018).
87 See Stout v. Med-Trans Corp., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1295–98 (N.D. Fla.
2018).
88 Id. at 1297.
89 See id. at 1298.
90 See Schneberger, 749 F. App’x at 679 n.11.
91 See, e.g., Wagner v. Summit Air Ambulance, LLC, No. CR-17-57-BU-BMM,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177709, at *13–15 (D. Mont. Oct. 26, 2017); Adams v. Air
Methods Corp., No. 3:15-cv-1683-TLW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174584, at *7–9
(D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2016).
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test as creating an ADA preemption exception for an implied-in-
fact contract. Though the facts required for an implied-in-fact
contract will not exist for every air ambulance patient, the right
plaintiffs have a shot at beating preemption and taking their
claims to state court. Additionally, the court relied on a rela-
tively new precedent set under Dan’s City that could help resolve
an unevenness in the litigating power between the air ambu-
lance companies and their patients. The court said that, based
on Dan’s City, the companies should not make their own claims
in state court based on equitable principles and then use ADA
preemption as a shield from patients’ claims under similar equi-
table principles. This could be of considerable benefit to pa-
tients who are incapacitated during life flights, as they probably
do not have an express contract. Though the result of the Scar-
lett case was more of the same for air ambulance patients, it cre-
ated a ray of hope for future patients in the Tenth Circuit and
thus the potential for reform.
